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Forty turbulent years: How the Fraser  Economic 
Commentary recorded the evolution of the modern 
Scottish economy 
 
Part 1:  Inflation, intervention and the battle for corporate 
independence, 1975 – 1990 
 
  Alf Young  
 
The recent economic history of Scotland, its performance and place within the UK and international 
economy can be traced through the pages of the Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary. Created in 
1975 by a private bequest from Sir Hugh Fraser, a prominent Scottish businessman, the Fraser of 
Allander Institute has provided a continuous commentary on the economic and related policy issues 
facing Scotland over the period.  In this the fortieth anniversary of the Fraser of Allander Institute, this is 
the first of three articles which charts Scotland’s transformation from an economy significantly based on 
manufacturing (and mining) to one that saw rapid deindustrialisation (in terms of output), the discovery of 
oil and the rapid transformation of its business base with the impact of both merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity as well as the varied impacts of successive governments’ industrial and regional policies.  
When the Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary first appeared, in quarterly installments, in July 
1975, the Scottish economy it set out to analyse was very different, in texture and tone, from the one it 
continues to appraise, now in its fortieth consecutive year. Then UK inflation was going through the roof. 
From May to November of 1975 the then-benchmark RPI measure of UK price inflation was consistently 
running at an annualised rate of 25% or above. Indeed inflation stayed in double digits for much of that 
decade and on into the early Thatcher years. At the start of this anniversary year, with the now-core CPI 
inflation measure reaching an all-time low of 0.3%, the fear stalking policy makers is not of hyper-
inflation and the kind of wage-price spiral that led to the “winter of discontent” in late 1978, but of the 
kind of deflationary spiral that has gripped Japan for much of the past quarter century and currently 
stalks the Eurozone. 
Nowadays the performance of Scotland’s labour market broadly mirrors that of the UK as a whole. 
Ministers in Edinburgh vie with London, when the monthly jobs figures come out, to lay claim to any 
marginal out-performance they can find. In the 1970s the differentials were starkly negative. Thanks to 
its heavy exposure to traditional manufacturing capacity, by then in serious decline, Scotland’s 
unemployment rate typically outstripped the UK rate by a very large margin. The very first Fraser 
Commentary noted that “the unemployment percentage in Scotland fell from an average of more than 
twice the UK rate in 1964 to a ratio of 1.7 in 1973.” It then noted that “by November 1974 the 
Scotland/GB rate had fallen to 1.48, the lowest figure recorded since 1954.” Had there not been massive 
net out-migration from Scotland in the fifties and sixties, one wonders how much bigger these adverse 
Scotland/UK unemployment ratios might have been in that period. Between 1951and 1971, net out-
migration from Scotland totalled 606,500. 
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One feature of the Scottish economy has been a constant thread though the past forty years. Oil. Less 
than a month after the second Fraser commentary appeared, on 3 November 1975, Her Majesty the 
Queen pressed a gold-plated button in Dyce, sending the first crude from BP’s Forties field from its 
landfall at Cruden Bay, by pipeline, to Grangemouth. Now, with the recent slump in the global oil price 
and Shell announcing plans to dismantle another iconic North Sea system, Brent, which lent its name to 
a global benchmark crude, all the talk is of the beginning of the end for the North Sea, if drastic fiscal 
action isn’t taken. The story from there to here has provided a continuous stream of material for debate, 
from whose oil it is anyway to the capacity of indigenous Scottish businesses to capitalise on the 
opportunities exploiting hydrocarbon reservoirs off our shores presented. 
Throughout, the fluctuating price of oil has been an ever-present and challenging reality. In 1973, in 
protest at the United States arming Israel in the Yom Kippur war, Arab states first imposed a supply 
embargo and then started hiking the global price of oil. By March 1974 the barrel price had quadrupled, 
from $3 to nearly $12. There was a stock market crash as recession bit. In the UK these problems were 
exacerbated by what came to be known as the Barber boom. In his 1972 Budget, Edward Heath’s 
chancellor Anthony Barber delivered a tax-cutting package designed to ensure the Heath government’s 
re-election. He certainly stimulated an intense burst of growth. But the electorate, in February 1974, 
returned a minority Labour government led by Harold Wilson. That very first Fraser commentary was 
blunt in its assessment of the Barber boom and its likely consequences. 
“The UK has been almost alone amongst industrialised countries in continuing to expand domestic 
demand, maintaining this expansion by means of heavy external borrowing,” (Vol 1 No 1) it argued. “A 
comparatively lower rate of unemployment has been achieved at the cost of an alarming and 
accelerating rate of inflation and deteriorating price competitiveness. However while the necessary 
readjustment of the domestic economy has been postponed, it cannot be avoided.”  
How right they were. Within months of being elected the minority Labour government had gone back to 
the voters, to be voted in again with a wafer thin majority. Harold Wilson resigned unexpectedly in March 
1976. Jim Callaghan replaced him as prime minister. By that November, Callaghan’s chancellor, Denis 
Healey, had had to go (‘cap in hand’ was always the phrase, no?) to the International Monetary Fund, 
seeking a loan and submitting the UK’s finances to IMF supervision. Distant echoes of the position 
facing the current Greek government; though its financial plans are now overseen by the ‘troika’ of the 
IMF, European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission. 
There was a second significant surge in global oil prices at the end of the 1970s. When the Shah was 
ousted in Iran in 1979 and through into 1980, when the Iran-Iraq conflict started, OPEC pushed the 
global price higher still. In its October 1980 commentary, the Fraser of Allander Institute estimated that a 
130% oil price hike would lead to an accumulated loss of output in the industrialised countries of around 
5% by the end of 1981 and would add an additional 11% to consumer prices. It expected the United 
States and the United Kingdom to experience absolute falls in output. “Both in deeds and words, the 
leaders of the western countries have made it clear that, given an apparent choice between greater 
inflation and greater unemployment, they have chosen greater unemployment,”  (Vol 6 No 1) the 
commentary warned.  
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When Margaret Thatcher’s first chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, unveiled his 1981 budget the following 
March, the Fraser authors found they had under-estimated just how uncompromising his approach 
would be. This was the mirror image of the Barber boom budget. Having pushed up VAT to 15% and 
added 10p to the cost of a gallon of petrol in his first budget in June 1979, Howe now froze personal tax 
thresholds and allowances and whacked a further 20p on the cost of a gallon of petrol. The April 1981 
commentary called the measures “ill-advised and their claimed justification - the restoration of order to 
the public finances - highly questionable.” (Vol 6 No 4)  Its authors were not alone. 
A group of 364 academic economists across the UK wrote to The Times1, claiming Howe’s measures 
had “no basis in economic theory” and would threaten the UK’s “social and political stability”. Among 
them was Mervyn King, later destined to become Governor of the Bank of England. A fierce debate has 
raged ever since. Howe’s supporters claim his approach did indeed tame inflation, leaving it at more 
subdued levels ever since. But the price that continues to be paid is, as the Fraser team foresaw, much 
higher average levels of joblessness in the UK economy than existed in the previous quarter century 
pre-1981. 
Higher global oil prices had a significant impact on the UK’s public finances. It has been argued that, 
without that offshore bounty, the Thatcher government might never have been able to finance the 
consequences, in terms of rising unemployment, of that controversial Howe budget in 1981. Revenues 
from UK oil and gas production grew steadily from 1980, peaking in 1984/5 and 1985/6. Then, having 
risen so high in the previous decade and a half, the oil price itself fell sharply again. Inevitably 
government revenues from oil and gas fell dramatically too. At 2009/10 prices, revenues peaked at 
£35bn in 1984/5. Two years later revenues had fallen in value by two-thirds. The November commentary 
in 1986 carried an article entitled ‘The Oil Price Collapse: some effects on the Scottish economy’(Vol 12 
No 2). It was written jointly by a member of the Fraser Institute’s staff, Jim Walker, and the oil economist 
at The Royal Bank of Scotland. An 11.5% fall in world oil demand and a substantial rise in non-OPEC 
production had put pressure on the oil price. The dollar barrel price had virtually halved since the start of 
the year. The paper suggested that, while lower oil prices might be good for global growth, “Scotland 
would seem to be a clear loser in that group of oil exporting states and oil related industries which are 
feeling the immediate and adverse impact of the oil price collapse on output and employment.” 
The RBS oil economist who, with Walker, penned that warning was Alex Salmond. It was his only 
contribution to the Fraser Economic Commentary. Nearly thirty years later, having been Scotland’s first 
minister for more than seven years, leading his country to an independence referendum, Salmond has 
now stepped out of government. As he did so the global oil price was again on the slide. Having virtually 
halved in just four months, Scotland is once more facing that challenge to output and jobs. Only this time 
the North Sea province is much more mature and the prospects for ongoing investment much more 
problematical. Oil has indeed been a continuous thread in forty years of Fraser commentaries 
When the first one appeared in 1975, the Scottish economy was already facing many, much-older, 
industrial challenges. Its coalfields, nationalised under the UK-wide National Coal Board in 1946, were 
struggling to stay competitive. Miners were fighting for wages that could keep pace with rampant price 
                                                        
1
 Including University of Strathclyde economists R. G. Brooks, Professor A. I. Clunies-Ross, K. Hancock, J. Sconller 
and P. Wanless – Philip Booth (Editor) Were 364 Economists All Wrong?, Institute for Economic Affairs, 2006 
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inflation. In 1972 they called their first official strike since 1926. A second followed at the start of 1974. 
On both occasions the Heath government’s response was to declare a state of emergency and 
implement a three-day week. The lights went out. Electricity was strictly rationed. Faced with that second 
strike, Heath decided to go to the country to seek a fresh mandate. But the electorate returned a minority 
Labour government which promptly settled with the NUM (National Union of Mineworkers). 
Fast forward to the 1980s and the explosive issue dividing miners and government turned from wages to 
pit closures. The incoming Thatcher administration backed down, in 1981, over plans to close 23 pits. 
But as we now know from her own biographer Charles Moore, one of the first things she did on taking 
office in 1979 was to tell her deputy Willie Whitelaw “The last Conservative government was destroyed 
by the miners’ strike. We’ll have another and we’ll win.” By 1981 the logistics and planning for ensuring 
that victory - stockpiling enough coal; mobilising police strength in coalfield areas - were not yet in place. 
By 1983 she had brought a Scot, Ian MacGregor, over from America to run the National Coal Board. He 
had privately put a massive pit closure programme back at the top of his agenda. A bitter, protracted 
battle with the miners, now led by Arthur Scargill, was almost inevitable. It lasted a year and left the 
NUM defeated, demoralised and divided. Thirty years on from that March 1985 denouement, the three 
remaining deep mines in the UK (none of them in Scotland) are due to shut over the next two years. 
The long decline in shipbuilding in Scotland and the rest of the UK has followed a shallower trajectory. 
Arguably production of ships reached its peak across these islands in the first decade of the 20th 
century. Had it not been for two world wars marine engineering might have emulated coal’s rapid 
endgame.  As it is ships are still being built on the Clyde, mainly for the Royal Navy. The latest, two 
massive aircraft carriers, are actually being assembled in huge modules at yards around the UK, then 
brought by barge to Rosyth on the Forth, for final assembly. When the Fraser commentary series began, 
there were still hopes of maintaining a viable merchant shipbuilding capacity in Scotland and across the 
rest of the UK. 
On the Clyde, the Geddes-inspired restructuring of the late sixties foundered with the liquidation of 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders in 1971, barely three years after five major shipbuilders on the upper river had 
amalgamated. The iconic work-in that followed, led by the late Jimmy Reid, served the workers in the 
yards more productively than Arthur Scargill’s mortal combat with Margaret Thatcher a decade later. In 
1977 what was left of UCS, together with the Scott Lithgow grouping on the Lower Clyde and numerous 
other yard groupings around Britain were merged into state-owned British Shipbuilders, headquartered 
in Newcastle. In the merchant yards the mismatch between order books and production capacity 
persisted. By the end of 1982, British Shipbuilders had closed half its yards. 
New legislation by the Thatcher government the following year ensured the remaining yards would be 
privatised once more. On the Clyde, Govan Shipbuilders became part of the Norwegian-owned Kvaerner 
group and the naval shipbuilder Yarrow became part of GEC’s Marconi division. Together they now 
constitute the naval ships arm of BAE Systems Maritime. On the Lower Clyde the small Ferguson yard 
survives (after a recent buy-out by the Scottish industrialist’s Clyde Blowers Capital), building ferries for 
the Scottish government and hoping for orders from the offshore and renewables sectors. 
It wasn’t just the historic bedrock of Scottish industry, like coal and shipbuilding,that was facing 
tumultuous times during these first fifteen years of Fraser commentaries. Singer, the American 
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corporation that then dominated world sewing machine manufacture, first came to Clydebank in the mid-
1880s. It built a production complex so vast it had its own distinctive clock tower and dedicated railway 
halt. By 1980 it was closing its gates for the last time.  Tractor manufacturer Massey-Ferguson came to 
Kilmarnock in 1948, but departed in 1978. British Aluminium opened a large smelter at Invergordon on 
the Cromarty Firth in 1971, only to close it at Christmas 1981. Diverse industries across Scotland, with 
life cycles a long as a century and as short as a decade, all falling like ninepins by the end of the 1970s. 
There were others. The giant car plant at Linwood. The pulp mill in Lochaber.  The BMC/Leyland truck 
and tractor plant at Bathgate. The strip steel mill at Ravenscraig. All now gone. Some forever enshrined 
in the Proclaimers’ plaintive lament Letter from America. Only Ravenscraig kept producing into the 
1990s, finally closing in 1992. In a commentary piece in 1982, reflecting on why such plants had been 
sanctioned and financially supported by the state in the first place, David Simpson was blunt “Their 
establishment and location was dictated by political, and not by economic, considerations. Since, in the 
modern world, change is continuing, closure of such uneconomic plants was only a matter of time.”(Vol 7 
No 3). 
Post-war regional policy was certainly deployed by governments, regardless of the party in power, to 
persuade companies to invest in some of the least economically dynamic parts of the country. The 
system of industrial development certificates, introduced by the Atlee Labour government in 1947, was 
used enthusiastically by the Macmillan Tory government in the early 1960s to persuade Lord Rootes, 
against his own instincts, to locate his Hillman Imp plant at Linwood, rather in the West Midlands. Harold 
Wilson, when prime minister, certainly lent on British Aluminium to build a new smelter at Invergordon. 
But other major investment decisions can be traced more to heritage and personal connections. The 
American Singer Corporation brought its sewing machine plant to Clydeside because the executive 
charged with taking the decision was an emigrant from Clydebank. Alfred Yarrow, having outgrown his 
existing site, brought his burgeoning shipyard to Scotstoun in Glasgow from Poplar in London in 1906, 
having advertised around the UK for a new home for his yard. He even persuaded many of his existing 
workforce to make the move with him and built homes around the yard in Scotstoun to house them. And 
Thomas J Watson, the founding father of what came to be known as IBM, though born in America was 
from Scottish emigrant stock. His friendship with the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Hector McNeil, 
helped ensure IBM’s first major European manufacturing plant came to Greenock in 1951. McNeil was 
Greenock’s MP at the time. 
In 1975 Labour, led by Harold Wilson, tried to reformulate the way government nurtured economic 
activity in Scotland by creating the Scottish Development Agency. The SDA was charged with furthering 
economic development; providing, maintaining or safeguarding employment; and promoting industrial 
efficiency and international competitiveness. It could invest directly in businesses (taking on the powers 
created for the National Enterprise Board in Scotland and paving the way for SDA’s engagement in 
Scotland’s nascent ‘hi-tech’ sector). SDA became Scotland’s biggest industrial landlord and had 
widespread powers over derelict land clearance and urban renewal. It took over from the Scottish 
Council the task of luring more IBMs to Scotland’s shores. In the jargon, inward investment. Its initial 
budget of £200m matched its wide-ranging powers. 
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The October 1974 general election had sent eleven SNP MPs to Westminster, most from Tory-held 
constituencies, on the slogan: It’s Scotland’s Oil. Labour’s creation of the SDA was widely seen as a 
political ploy by Wilson and his Scottish Secretary Willie Ross to blunt that nationalist charge. Labour 
had, of course, created a template for the SDA a decade earlier, in 1965, when it launched the 
Highlands & Islands Development Board, with a radical mandate to revitalise the economy of the fragile 
North of Scotland. But while the HIDB drew strength from the less partisan nature of politics above the 
highland fault line, the advent of the SDA breached the old cross-party consensus on regional policy that 
had flourished in the fifties and sixties. The SDA became something of a political and ideological football.  
It wasn’t that conservatives, even those led by Margaret Thatcher from 1979, were consistently hostile to 
state intervention when markets looked like doing things they’d rather they didn’t. At the start of the 
1970s, when an insolvent Rolls Royce went into receivership, Ted Health nationalised it to secure its 
future. The next Tory to enter Downing Street as prime minister faced a similar challenge. With a similar 
result.  When the Glasgow-based engineers, the Weir Group, chaired by Viscount Weir, got into serious 
financial difficulties in 1981, the SDA was prevailed upon to participate in a rescue package. 
And in the same year, when the Royal Bank of Scotland board was minded to accept a takeover bid by 
the London-based Standard Chartered Bank, only to find itself on the receiving end of a much-higher 
hostile bid from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Mrs Thatcher’s Scottish ministers 
went public on their hostility to both bids and helped ensure the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
threw both of them out. As a memorandum from Professors McGilvray and Simpson to the MMC in the 
July 1981 edition of the commentary put it: “In terms of market capitalisation, the Royal Bank is the 
second largest company with its head office in Scotland. it is not putting it too strongly to say that if the 
Royal Bank goes, it will the beginning of the end of the indigenous private sector in Scotland, with all 
which that implies for the regeneration of Scottish industry.” (Vol 7 No 1) 
One of the dominating features of that whole decade was the wave of takeovers of major private sector 
players in the Scottish economy by rival businesses. Having fended off a takeover bid from Tiny 
Rowland’s Lonrho in 1981, thanks to another MMC veto, the department store chain House of Fraser 
was sold to the Al Fayed family in 1985. Harrods is now owned by the Qatari royal family. The rest of the 
chain, having passed through Icelandic hands, is now in Chinese ownership. In 1983 South African-
based Charter acquired mining equipment maker Anderson Strathclyde, based in Motherwell. Britoil, 
which started life in 1975 as the state-owned British National Oil Corporation, was privatised in two 
stages by the Thatcher government, first in 1982, then in 1985. Just three years after that floatation of 
the fourth biggest oil and gas producer in the North Sea was completed, it was acquired by BP. In 1986 
the Glasgow-based thread maker Coats Paton was taken over by David Alliance’s Viyella group. 
The messiest of the 1980s takeover wave engulfing Scotland’s private sector hit the whisky sector. In 
1984 the Irish brewer Guinness launched a surprise takeover bid for the Perth-based whisky distiller 
Arthur Bell. Having swallowed Bells, it then downed the much-bigger Distillers Company, home to a 
whole family of well-known brands of Scotch. Distillers accepted the embrace of the Ernest Saunders-
led Guinness, rather than succumb to the mercies of the Argyll Group supermarket chain, led by the 
upstart Jimmy Gulliver. The outcome split the Scottish business establishment. The then governor of the 
Bank of Scotland Sir Tom Risk and a leading Edinburgh lawyer Sir Charles Fraser had agreed to serve 
with Saunders on the enlarged United Distillers group board. But when promises made to them weren’t 
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kept, the flak began to fly. Saunders and three others were subsequently charged with fraudulently 
manipulating the Guinness share price to win the battle for Distillers. Saunders served ten months of a 
thirty month sentence in an open prison. 
The fear expressed by McGilvray and Simpson over the fate of the Royal Bank, that its loss of 
independence would spell “the beginning of the end of the indigenous private sector in Scotland” was 
widely shared at the time. There was sustained debate, even in boardroom and professional circles, 
about what kind of protectionist measures might stem the tide and retain more headquarters control in 
Scotland. Could some kind of tartan ring-fence, enforced by the competition authorities, be erected? But 
as we will see, in later stages of this three-part story, that trend was not reversed. Indeed it spread to 
areas like finance and professional services. And the Scottish bank that was saved from itself in 1981, 
RBS, ended up going on a massive takeover spree of its own that plunged it into a near-death 
experience. 
The Thatcher government’s comparative pragmatism over intervening directly in markets, as it did over 
the possible collapse of the Weir Group and the Royal Bank’s corporate independence did not extend to 
buying in to its Labour predecessor’s vision of the role of the fledgling SDA. At the start of 1980 more 
restrictive guidelines were issued on when Agency could invest directly in businesses and in what form – 
and dropping its Labour-inspired aim to extend trade union representation in Scottish industry. The 
following year the business of attracting more foreign direct investment into Scotland was hived off to a 
new joint SDA/Scottish Office agency Locate In Scotland. In the latter half of the decade, the SDA was 
told to sell off its large industrial property portfolio and leave more of the task of housing Scotland’s 
industries to the commercial property sector. In between there was a select committee inquiry and 
various National Audit Office and HM Treasury trawls to keep the SDA on its toes. 
The vast Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project (GEAR), coordinated by the Agency – at the 
Government’s direction - and launched the year after the SDA was up and running, was allowed, under 
the Tories, to complete its ten-year journey. However the fact that has taken a project of the scale of last 
year’s Commonwealth Games to revisit the physical regeneration of much of that same area of 
Glasgow’s East End speaks volumes about how difficult it is to renew economic vitality in physically run-
down inner city areas. The creation of Locate in Scotland had a positive impact on the flow of inward 
investment to Scotland, notably the steady stream of electronics ventures coming to swell the residents 
of Scotland’s ‘Silicon Glen’. Some, of course, had been coming long before that. There was a wave in 
the 1940s and 1950s. Ferranti, IBM, Burroughs, Honeywell, NCR. Motorola brought its first chip plant to 
East Kilbride in the 1960s. National Semiconductor brought another to Greenock in the 1970s. 
But the wave of plants that opened in the 1980s, mainly in Scotland’s New Towns, many assembling the 
hardware for the first generations of desk top computers, seemed to herald a new industrial dawn. 
Sadly, thanks the speed of innovation in the technology and the emergence of even lower-cost locations 
to do such work, notably in Eastern Europe and the Far East, it was to prove a transient boom. 
Attempts were made to attract other emerging technologies. In 1985, to much fanfare, Damon Biotech 
was supposed to be coming to Livingston, with $40m of investor backing, to build the biggest 
monoclonal antibody plant in the world. It did not happen. Risk is, of course, unavoidable for any national 
development agency, seeking to replace outmoded industries with tomorrow’s growth businesses. But, 
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by the late eighties, it was becoming clearer that the Thatcher government had never quite forgiven the 
SDA for being Labour’s initiative. Its death knell was sounded in 1988 when a Tory supporting 
businessman Bill Hughes came up with a new model - a network of enterprise agencies with strong 
business representation that would not only reignite Scotland’s entrepreneurial spirit but take over 
responsibility for skills training too. How Scottish Enterprise came to be forms past two of this series. 
And how did the state of the Scottish economy look as the first fifteen years of the Fraser commentaries 
drew to a close? I’ll leave the last word to Dr John Hall TSB Scotland’s Treasury Economist. In his 
economic briefing in the last issue of 1989 (Vol. 15, No. 2) he writes “Companies, already faced with a 
burgeoning financial deficit and a squeeze on profits and liquidity, may then be forced into a period of 
intense labour shedding, thus tipping the economy towards recession. The intensity of pressures in the 
labour market have once again raised the spectre of stagflation, albeit of a milder form than previously 
experienced and in the context of a far more benign international environment: slugflation may be a 
more appropriate term.”  (Vol 15 No 2) Slugflation? It’s a period of sluggish growth and rising inflation. 
An Age of Diminished Expectations perhaps, to borrow the title of one of Paul Krugman’s books. To see 
what the 1990s did bring for the Scottish economy, read the next installment of SERIES TITLE in June’s 
Fraser Economic Commentary (Vol. 39, No. 1). 
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